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ECOLABEL PROGRAMS AND GREEN
CONSUMERISM: PRESERVING A HYBRID
APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
Since environmental law emerged as a method for regulating industry
pollution, command and control technology-based standards have been the
dominant government strategy and the dominant recipients of academic
criticism.1 To alleviate the inefficiencies of technology-based standards,
critics advocated for changing the method used to set standards,2 as well as
for complete alternatives such as market-based and information-based
design schemes.3 Others believed that “the use of multiple instruments will
tend to be the rule rather than the exception” for setting broad
environmental laws.4 Modern government environmental programs often
intertwine regulatory standards with ecolabel programs,5 but whether such
intervention has eradicated the problems of technology-based standards is
questionable.6
Ecolabel programs substantiated by third-party certification exemplify a
hybrid form of environmental law, using standards, incentives, and
1. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart]; Rena I. Steinzor,
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control,
22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 112 (1998); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of TechnologyBased Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2000). Command and control regulations
“require or proscribe specific conduct by regulated firms.” Richard B. Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1264
(1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Conceptual Framework].
2. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
21, 38–40 (2001) [hereinafter Stewart, New Generation].
3. Id. at 94–99, 127–29.
4. Robert W. Hahn, The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a
Unifying Framework, 65 PUB. CHOICE 21, 36 (Apr. 1990). See also Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified
Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 150 n.5 (1993)
(“Incentive-based, market-driven means of accomplishing environmental goals can serve as
valuable supplements to traditional command-and-control regulatory programs.”).
5. See, e.g., U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE (2010) [hereinafter
LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE], available at https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID
=7924 (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification for buildings
implemented by federal, state, and local governments); AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, NATIONAL
ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL ORGANIC
PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION], available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile
?dDocName=STELDEV3004443 (the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic food
labeling program); ENERGY STAR, THE ENERGY STAR® LABEL: A SUMMARY OF PRODUCT
LABELING OBJECTIVES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES2 (2003), available at http://www.energystar
.gov/ia/partners/prod_development/downloads/guiding_princip.pdf. (ENERGY STAR appliance
labeling program).
6. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Organic program suffers from inadequate
enforcement. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USDA, AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY 1, 1–4,
OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM (Mar. 2010).
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information to implement change.7 An ecolabel is “[a] visual
communication tool indicating environmentally preferable products,
services or companies that are based on standards or criteria.”8 Ecolabel
regulations, as a form of information-based government intervention, work
best “when the label’s meaning is well understood by consumers and
reflects their preferences.”9 When the ecolabel program is implemented
prematurely, ahead of the consumer learning curve, such initiative to inform
consumers about a product’s environmental benefits with a simple label
results in insufficient disclosure of a product’s environmental attributes.10
Paradoxically, the shorthand endorsement of attributes precludes the
consumer from making informed choices.11 Additionally, unsubstantiated
and unverified environmental claims could lead to consumer deception and
mistrust of the ecolabel.12
As consumers have become more interested in purchasing sustainable
products, academics, politicians, and even industries have stressed a need to
mitigate issues of consumer confusion and mistrust and have advocated for
government regulation and uniformity of ecolabel programs, standards, and
environmental claims.13 Meanwhile, government agencies have taken an
active role in implementing and incentivizing ecolabel programs that
require third-party certification, or compliance with such certification,14 so
that the consumer has “assurance that a product, process or service
7. See, e.g., Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 97, 136.
8. Greener Products Glossary, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/greenerproducts/glossary/index
.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2012).
9. David Conner & Ralph Christy, The Organic Label: How to Reconcile its Meaning with
Consumer Preferences, 35 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RES. 40, 40 (2004).
10. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 139. “One of the primary limitations in
environmental labeling programs . . . has been a lack of consumer awareness or interest in ecolabels and the information they seek to provide.” Id.
11. See Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54
MD. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (1995).
12. Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific
Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark
Program, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 (1994) (describing the current “green consumer market” as
“dysfunctional” because of unsubstantiated claims, deceptive fact-skewing, and resulting
consumer cynicism).
13. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 11, at 1462–63 (advocating for a market-oriented approach
due to the inadequacy of eco-information alone). The eco-information program could be reformed
with the federal government acting as the central authority and the state and local governments
implementing the regulations. Menell, supra note 11, at 1463, 1470, 1472. See also Lauren C.
Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation, 14 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 685 (2006); Jessica E. Fliegelman, Note, The Next Generation of Greenwash:
Diminishing Consumer Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1001 (2010); Greg Northen, Comment, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive
Green Marketing in an Increasingly Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 101
(2011); Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal
Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Avi Gesser, Comment, Canada’s Environmental Choice Program: A Model for a
“Trade-friendly” Eco-Labeling Scheme, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501, 501 (1998).
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conforms to specified requirements.”15 However, this movement for
uniformity could threaten the hybrid balance of the ecolabel form of
environmental regulation, resulting in a return to, rather than an evolution
from, the themes of traditional command and control regulation so
vehemently opposed today.
This note will present three examples of well-developed organizations
that have implemented third-party certification ecolabel programs that have
received widespread acceptance within their industry. They exemplify how
government-administered or government-encouraged ecolabel programs
have limits to their effectiveness. Consumer misconceptions about what
these ecolabel programs actually represent persist, and the programs do not
necessarily encourage anything more than a discrete traditional standard.
These approaches dampen the effectiveness of a hybrid form of
environmental regulation, and have resulted in ecolabel programs with
third-party certification suffering from many of the same problems of
command and control technology-based standards.
Part I provides an overview of technology-based standard setting and its
shortcomings as an environmental regulation, and compares it with marketbased alternatives. Part II explains the background of the environmental
consumerism movement. As consumers demanded eco-friendly products
and the industry responded by producing products claiming to be ecofriendly, various stakeholders—including non-governmental organizations,
federal agencies, and state governments—contemplated methods for
protecting consumers from unsubstantiated environmental claims. Part III
evaluates three mainstream ecolabel programs in the United States: United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic for agricultural
products, ENERGY STAR for appliances, and Leadership in Energy &
Environmental Design (LEED) for buildings. After an overview of the
program, each ecolabel will be evaluated based on how consumers
comprehend the ecolabel and whether the ecolabel program suffers from
regulatory issues rooted in traditional command and control environmental
theory. Finally, Part IV concludes by advocating for hybrid regulatory
controls as effective strategies in promoting consumer comprehension.
I. THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: FROM
COMMAND AND CONTROL TO MARKET-BASED
SOLUTIONS
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government enacted a series of
environmental regulations targeting pollution.16 As a result, “every
discharge into the land, water or air . . . requires direct or indirect
15. Greener Products Glossary, supra note 8.
16. E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 317 (1985).
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permission from the national government.”17 The federal government has
preferred to use standards as opposed to screening because it capitalizes on
economies of scale, maintains the control of a centralized decision-making
authority (as opposed to delegating to state and local governments), and
“avoid[s] competitive or regional disruption.”18 Environmental economists
generally focus on correcting externalities at the manufacture or
development level, so that product prices accurately represent environmental harm.19
Criticism of these environmental tools led academics to consider the
next evolution in environmental regulation.20 They argued that
environmental law should shift to a system that involved the public in
answering whether current regulations are too ambitious, too lax, or just
right,21 and implement a strategy focused at the consumer level to improve
environmental quality sufficiently.22 Ecolabel programs have emerged as a
solution because they assist consumers in directly addressing environmental
externalities and in making informed purchases.23 And though
environmentalists tend to prefer the current standards-based approach while
industries usually want market-based environmental controls,24 ecolabel
programs combine the advantages of both regulatory tools.25
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGYBASED STANDARD SETTING
As command and control regulations mandate certain actions,26 the
government may implement the system through “standards” or “screening”
techniques.27 Standards are requirements “uniformly applied to an entire
category of products or processes,” whereas screening makes individual,
17. Id. Water and air pollution are regulated by technology standards based on best available
technology. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1334–35. See also Wagner, supra note 1, at 85
n.7.
18. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1266. For products, uniformity helps
industries and enforcers benefit from economies of scale. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 618 (1996). Uniformity of process is desirable
when “network effects are significant,” meaning that a jurisdiction benefits by adopting a
previously developed policy design, even if not perfectly tailored to the jurisdiction, to avoid
substantial costs of developing one itself. Id. at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). Industries
supported national rules because they were viewed as a lesser evil than having to deal with infinite
state and local government strategies. Elliott et al., supra note 16, at 333.
19. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 94.
20. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1334.
21. Id. at 1353.
22. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD 147–48 (2008).
23. Menell, supra note 11, at 1444.
24. Hahn, supra note 4, at 30.
25. Gesser, supra note 14, at 504, 512.
26. See generally Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1.
27. Id. at 1265.
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case-by-case, decisions.28 Technology-based standards, also known as
design standards, are set after the government assesses industry practices,
the current equipment available to control pollution, and the realistic
effectiveness of such equipment.29 By taking inventory of what methods are
possible, the government then sets pollution limits for industry classes that
correlate to the individual businesses using such technology.30
The main advantages of technology-based standards are consistent and
predictable results, reduced implementation costs, and transparent decision
making.31 Because of the uncertainty in human-caused environmental
impact, technology standards remain “one of the most reliable methods for
controlling pollution.”32 A central regulation scheme, as compared to
individual decision making, enables “broad-based scientific activities” and
“collectively derived best approximations about environmental harms.”33
There is no need to prove the harm associated with the pollution, reducing
the burden of establishing causation.34 Standards also address pollution with
technology solutions rather than “switching to inherently less polluting
[sources].”35 With standards, environmental protection is of paramount
importance in setting regulations.36
Despite the numerous advantages, technology-based standards have
borne the brunt of command and control environmental regulation
criticism,37 particularly for economic inefficiency and agency failure.38 The
requirements apply uniformly to a specific group, even though the
ecological conditions, human effects, and opportunity costs may vary
widely within each class or category.39 “[D]iffering control capabilities and
cost functions of particular polluters” are of no concern.40 Additionally, new

28. Id. See also Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and Fine-Tuning Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 n.8
(1985) (noting standards are set by “different categories or classes of industries”).
29. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 88–89. Other standards are based on harm levels, costs and
benefits, and performance. Id. at 87 n.14.
30. Id. at 88–89. Technology-based standards almost always set a numerical limit but often are
misconstrued as always requiring a specific technology to actually be implemented. Id. at 90 n.26.
31. Latin, supra note 28, at 1271. Even if the program is expensive, it is still economically
feasible. Id. at 1273.
32. Wagner, supra note 1.
33. Esty, supra note 18, at 578–80.
34. Latin, supra note 28, at 1303.
35. Elliott et al., supra note 16, at 333.
36. Latin, supra note 28, at 1268 n.6.
37. Steinzor, supra note 1, at 114. Health-based standards are preferable to technology-based
standards, but obtaining the information necessary to set correct pollution levels to correlate with
health effects is extremely difficult. Id. at 113–14.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Latin, supra note 28, at 1268 n.7.
40. Id. at 1269 n.8. See also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335 (stating that uniform
technology standards are wasteful because they do not assess individual costs or individual
pollution effects).
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sources are regulated more stringently than existing sources.41 This
potentially discourages new players from entering the market.42
Regulations can “foreclose innovation opportunities.”43 The agency’s
snapshot assessment of available technology fails to encourage continuous
innovation of environmental technology.44 An industry has no incentive to
do any better than what the standard requires.45 Also, a “moving target”
phenomenon occurs, whereby “uncertain, shifting targets . . . can chill
innovation incentives among regulated firms”46 because industries have
difficulty in predicting the standards about to be imposed upon them.47
Within a single agency, setting standards may be separated from
monitoring and enforcing responsibilities, and could hinder an effective
bargaining process that fully considers intra-agency tradeoffs.48 The
government has limited resources, is unable to fund effective monitoring,
and must rely on industry self-reporting.49 Even when illegal acts are
discovered, the sanctions imposed are ineffective deterrents.50 In summary,
many critics feel that “technology-based standards have not met their
potential.”51
B. MARKET-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
Through economic incentive programs, the government tries to
establish its environmental goals by using economic instruments to set the
correct price of a unit of environmental degradation,52 in contrast to
command and control programs that attempt to set the correct quantity of
total environmental degradation.53 Industries remain free to set their own
internal quantity but are incentivized to lower their quantities of harm and
to develop the most cost-effective means for complying with such limits.54
A related field of environmental theory is “reflexive law,”55 which can
supplement or work in conjunction with the existing regulatory schemes.56
41. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 4, at 27; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.
42. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.
43. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1262. “Market innovation” relates to
increasing market output per unit of input. Id. at 1261. “Social innovation” relates to developing
new methods that promote public welfare. Id.
44. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.
45. Latin, supra note 28, at 1269 n.9.
46. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1272.
47. Id. at 1271.
48. Hahn, supra note 4, at 39.
49. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1344–45.
50. Id.
51. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 110–12 (viewing, optimistically, technology-based standards
as having room for improvement).
52. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 96.
53. Id. at 94.
54. Id. at 95.
55. Id. at 127.
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The objective of reflexive law is to “promote the internalization of
environmental norms . . . as opposed to directly controlling . . . external
conduct.”57 Like economic incentives, reflexive law continues to focus on
industry conduct, not consumer conduct.58
Problems with such programs include the ability to provide accurate
data in a clear way to consumers, ability to obtain market data as to whether
consumers will actually pay a premium, and reluctance to aggregate such
consumer preferences to set national environmental goals.59 Thus, these
programs have been described as “unsuitable candidates” for replacing
command and control programs entirely, though could be “useful
supplements” in the broad environmental regulatory scheme.60
C. A HYBRID APPROACH: ECOLABEL STRATEGIES FOR
CORRECTING ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND
EMPOWERING CONSUMERS TO EXPRESS THEIR PURCHASE
PREFERENCES
In the United States, a main culprit of environmental harm is consumer
behavior.61 Another market-driven method for mitigating environmental
damage associated with consumption is through “green consumerism,”
where consumers want to buy green products and businesses want to
produce them.62 Green consumerism is one of the few environmental
protection strategies that align the interests of environment and industry.63
Ecolabel programs are a hybrid form of environmental regulation
because they set uniform criteria for an entire class,64 like technology-based
standards, but independent organizations develop their own methods for
certifying environmental attributes.65 As an alternative to command and
56. Id. at 129, 130.
57. Id. at 127.
58. Id. Ecolabel programs within this category inform consumers about a firm or product’s
environmental performance so that the consumer purchases from them instead of from
environmentally inferior performing firms or products. Id. at 97. The ecolabel indirectly imposes a
tax on poorly performing environmental products because the businesses that make such products
suffer from diminished sales. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 96–97.
61. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 147.
62. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 148; Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150; see also Ciannat M.
Howett, Note, The “Green Labeling” Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of
Environmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 403 (1992) (stating that “green”
consumerism is a method to “increase the market for environmentally-sound products”).
63. See, e.g., Gesser, supra note 14, at 501 (“For producers, these labels are an opportunity to
increase sales for certain products that meet the labeling requirements. From the
environmentalist's perspective, the labels help preserve the environment by encouraging
consumers to buy, and manufacturers to produce, products that are not harmful to the
environment.”). Regarding environmental policy, industries are concerned about profit effects
while environmentalists care about environmental effects. See Hahn, supra note 4, at 25.
64. Gesser, supra note 14, at 5004.
65. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136–37.
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control, industries develop their own regulations, usually with public
participation and government oversight.66 Whereas a market-based system
relies on the price to reflect environmental externalities, information-based
ecolabels describe environmental attributes about a product.67 Ecolabel
programs and third-party certification let individuals express their
willingness to pay for noneconomic benefits as private consumers,68 in
contrast to technology-based rationales that force individuals to pay as
public citizens.69 Informed individuals will also be better equipped to
engage in civic action, which is crucial to the success of modern
environmental activism.70
Ecolabel programs rely on the theory that third-party certification selfregulation will work because “an industry consensus will develop over time
regarding the criteria for environmental seals.”71 Consumers identify the
best products without requiring costly government monitoring and
enforcement.72 The success of green consumerism, however, depends on
accurate information regarding the environmental attributes of the
product.73
II. HISTORY OF GREEN CONSUMERISM AND THE
“GREENWASHING” PHENOMENON
As environmental effects of human activity became increasingly
publicized, consumers recognized “that their individual and collective
purchasing . . . decisions significantly affect the quality of the
environment.”74 A surge of environmentally conscious consumers started to
consider environmental effects when comparing products.75 Indeed,
consumers wanted to buy green products and were willing to pay a
premium for them.76 In response, businesses wanted to capitalize on the
66. See Steinzor, supra note 1, at 104.
67. See Menell, supra note 11, at 1442–43.
68. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 141 (discussing how individuals make the
decision to act).
69. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 741–42 (discussing noneconomic benefits of protecting workers and the environment).
70. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 221. A “New Democracy” supporting environmental change
will rely on “direct democracy—citizens debating the options, learning together, overcoming their
differences, and coming to decision. It is far away from today’s interest-group, representational
democracy.” Id.
71. Fliegelman, supra note 13, at 1045.
72. See id. at 1046.
73. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 150.
74. Howett, supra note 62, at 401.
75. See, e.g., Howett, supra note 62, at 401–03; Scott Hume & Patricia Strnad, Consumers Go
‘Green,’ ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 3 (publishing a consumer national survey showing
that consumers were concerned enough about environmental effects that they were willing to
change their buying habits by sacrificing convenience or paying more).
76. Grodsky, supra note 4, at 147, 149.
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new interest in sustainable products and claim that they produced green
products.77 Consumer interest in buying green products became “perhaps
the most important marketing trend of the [1990s].”78
However, manufacturers were unclear in substantiating their products’
environmental claims.79 Many green marketing terms had “no clear,
uniform meaning.”80 Additionally, a product could advertise one
environmental benefit even though there was tradeoff environmental
harm.81 An energy-efficient light bulb could contain toxic chemicals.82 The
American Heart Association’s initiative to label foods that were less bad
than comparable foods regarding heart disease with a HeartGuide label
caused controversy because unlabeled products in another food category
would likely be healthier.83 The legitimacy of such green product claims
varied considerably, which “led to consumer confusion and mistrust of
environmental claims in general.”84
Because of the consumer mistrust of manufacturer claims forming, the
success of green consumerism faced formidable challenges: consumers
were less experienced in evaluating the validity of environmental claims
themselves,85 and such frustration over confusing marketing claims could
hinder the consumer’s pursuit of eco-friendly products.86 “Information
strategies rely entirely on stakeholders to act upon the information.”87 Yet,
as James Gustave Speth stated in The Bridge at the Edge of the World, it
would be “foolhardy to count on major [environmental] change from the
voluntary consumer choices of individuals.”88 Some level of government
regulation is necessary.89 In the early 1990s, the idea that green
consumerism desperately needed a set of uniform guidelines gained wide
support.90
77. See, e.g., Roger D. Wynne, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 786–87 (1991); Howett, supra note 62, at 401–
02. For example, 26 percent of all new household items introduced in 1990 claimed to have some
sort of environmental benefit. Id. at 402.
78. CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., FLA. ATTORNEY GEN., MASS. ATTORNEY GEN., MINN. ATTORNEY
GEN., MO. ATTORNEY GEN., N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., TEX. ATTORNEY GEN., UTAH ATTORNEY
GEN., WASH. ATTORNEY GEN. & WIS. ATTORNEY GEN., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND
PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 12 (1990)
[hereinafter THE GREEN REPORT].
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id.
81. Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150–51 (stating that “the advertised environmental benefits of
products are often undercut by undisclosed environmental harms”).
82. Id. at 151.
83. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
84. Howett, supra note 62, at 402.
85. See, e.g., Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150.
86. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 19.
87. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136.
88. SPETH, supra note 22, at 156.
89. Id. at 150.
90. See, e.g., THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 19.
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A. PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNSUBSTANTIATED
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT CLAIMS WITH MARKETING
GUIDELINES
The “greenwashing” phenomenon led federal agencies, state
governments, and industry leaders to strategize about how best to regulate
environmental product claims and protect green consumerism.91 In 1990,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and ten states’ Attorneys General (collectively, the
Task Force), came together to discuss the recent influx of environmental
marketing claims and develop solutions for ensuring that consumers were
protected from deceptive advertisement.92 The Task Force determined that
the federal government was the appropriate source of regulation and “is
preferable to industry self-regulation” because of the broad range of product
categories and because the federal government is responsible for reducing
environmental harm.93 Recommendations for federal action included
creating national environmental marketing terminology and testing
protocol.94
National uniform guidelines do exist.95 In 1992, the FTC published a set
of guidelines “[t]o help marketers make truthful and substantiated
environmental claims.”96 Its Green Guides publication is not enforceable as
law, but is a useful resource for private industries and businesses seeking to
avoid consumer deception regarding environmental advertisement.97
Additionally, private firms published marketing guides for consumers and
industries.98 TerraChoice, a “sustainable marketing and consulting” firm,99
describes the seven types of “Sins” that a manufacturer may employ when
advertising the environmental attributes of a product.100 The sins include

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See, e.g., id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 20–24.
Id. at 20–21.
The FTC publishes its Green Guides to “help marketers avoid making green claims that
are ‘unfair or deceptive’ in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.” It’s Too Easy Being Green:
Defining Fair Green Marketing Principles: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2009)
(statement of James Kohm, Assoc. Dir., Enforcement Div., FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/os/2009/06/P954501greenmarketing.pdf.
96. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 63,552
(proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260).
97. Federal Trade Commission Proposes Revised “Green Guides,” FTC (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/10/greenguide.shtm.
98. E.g., TERRACHOICE GROUP, THE SINS OF GREENWASHING (2010), available at http:
//sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010/.
99. Mission and History, UL TERRACHOICE, http://terrachoice.com/about/mission-history/
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
100. THE SINS OF GREENWASHING, supra note 98, at 10.
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“hidden trade-off,” “no proof,” “vagueness,” “irrelevance,” “lesser of two
evils,” “fibbing,” and “worshiping false labels.”101
The Task Force recognized that national standards and environmental
certification programs shared the same goal of improving consumer
information.102 Because of the need for distinct uniform guidelines, the
Task Force advised that certification and seal of approval programs were
well-suited to coexist, rather than merge, with a federal regulatory
program.103
B. ECOLABELS AND THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION SOLUTIONS FOR
SUBSTANTIATING GREEN MARKETING CLAIMS
Third-party certification and seal of approval programs emerged.104 In
1991, there were about fifty ecolabels launched that year.105 In 2011, there
were over 350 total ecolabel programs.106 With ecolabels, “[t]he concept is
simple—to reduce an evaluation of a product or process into a simple,
environmentally beneficial sign.”107 Ecolabels are considered “positive”
information strategies.108 Environmental labeling educates the consumer
about “the environmental and social impacts of the products and services
they buy and use.”109 This empowers the consumer to make a conscious
decision about her environmental preference.110 Additionally,
manufacturers want to capitalize on the market advantage for incorporating
environmental considerations into their products.111

101. Id.
102. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 26 (stating that government or industry should
enforce clear standards that would “provide consumers with more information about the
environmental consequences of their purchasing decisions”).
103. Id. at 26–27.
104. SPETH, supra note 22, at 150–51; CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, DUKE
UNIVERSITY, AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 8 (Jay S. Golden ed., 2010), available at http://center.sustainability.duke
.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ecolabelsreport.pdf.
105. Anastasia O’Rourke, Trends in Ecolabeling, CSRHUB, 4 (May 3, 2011) (webinar),
http://www.csrhub.com/files/Sustainable_Industries_Webinar_2011.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136.
108. Id. at 134. “Information strategies can take many forms in source, type, amount,
complexity and audience. They can be negative, such as tobacco warning labels on cigarettes;
neutral, as in required reporting under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); or
positive, such as eco-labels that disclose the behavioral environmental characteristics of products.”
Id.
109. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, GREEN PROCUREMENT AND
THE WTO: SIGNIFICANCE FOR WORLD BANK BORROWERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter ECO-LABELING
STANDARDS], available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Ecolabeling_WTO_Mar05.pdf.
110. See id. at iii.
111. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, supra note 104, at 10.
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A single-attribute claim focuses on one environmental aspect whereas a
multi-attribute claim evaluates several types of environmental indicators.112
Whether the label indicates an environmental process or an environmental
product has been “a focal point in environmental policy debates.”113 A
process label evaluates how the product was made, whereas a product label
indicates “observable or testable characteristics of the final product
itself.”114 Information labels, which have been more effective than simple
seal of approval logos, allow the consumer to compare environmental
characteristics across products.115
Governments and agencies have implemented their own combination of
regulations, third-party certifications, and seal of approval programs.116
Moreover, state and local governments are using ecolabels to indicate
compliance with program requirements.117 Government regulation of
certification and seal of approval programs ranges from requiring labels on
certain products that inform the consumer about a specified environmental
quality, to regulating the right of a product to indicate a certain attribute, to
general advisement of voluntary programs administered by third parties.118
The FTC continues to offer general guidelines for ecolabel programs.119 The
FTC’s proposed Green Guides adds a new section called “Certifications
and Seals of Approval,” but clarifies that claims by third-party programs are
technically already covered under the “Endorsement Guides” section.120
Significantly, the proposed changes to the guides “cautions marketers that
unqualified seals of approval and certifications likely constitute general
environmental benefit claims and, because marketers are unlikely to be able
to substantiate such claims, they should not use unqualified certifications or
seals of approval.”121
112. Stephanie Vierra, Green Building Standards and Certification Systems, WHOLE BLDG.
DESIGN GUIDE, http://www.wbdg.org/resources/gbs.php#ar (last updated Sept. 26, 2011)
(referencing ISO 14000 Type I and Type II categories).
113. Michelle T. Friedland, You Call that Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 385 (2005).
114. Id. at 384.
115. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS,
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: PROMOTING CLIMATE-FRIENDLY HOUSEHOLD
CONSUMPTION PATTERNS ¶ 42 (2007) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND
PRODUCTION], available at http://www.greeningtheblue.org/sites/default/files/Sustainable
%20consumption%20&%20Production.pdf.
116. Some agencies, like the Department of Agriculture, have created a national definition of
“organic” food, then established procedures for third-party certification of the process and labels
for marking the food. NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note
5.
117. See Erin Elizabeth Burg Hupp, Refining Green Building Regulations and Funding Green
Buildings in Order to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 42 URB. LAW. 639, 641–42 (2010).
118. See ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, supra note 109, at 4–5.
119. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552
(proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260).
120. Id. at 63,564–68.
121. Id. at 63,566.
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III. EVALUATION OF THREE WIDELY RECOGNIZED
ECOLABELS IN THE UNITED STATES BASED ON
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND CONSUMER
COMPREHENSION OF WHAT THE ECOLABEL ACTUALLY
REPRESENTS ABOUT THE PRODUCT
Ecolabels have been criticized for their proliferation in the United
States—there are too many organizations and too many methodologies used
in creating ecolabel criteria122 because each third-party organization tends to
focus on the environmental attributes and impacts relevant to their own
industry.123 Ecolabel programs “face issues of brand awareness,
understanding and consumer trust,”124 and risk further exacerbating
consumer confusion.125 “Because such programs generally involve an
overall stamp of approval rather than a description of the specific
environmental attributes of a product, they are necessarily based on
complicated value judgments about what is best for the environment.”126 In
doing so, the organization is making its own assumptions about the
parameters a consumer needs, wants, and understands in order to evaluate
an environmental claim.127
Ecolabel programs also vary by the program administration, ranging
from nonprofit organizations to government agencies.128 Government
organizations only operate 15 percent of the total ecolabel programs.129
Some critics of ecolabel programs suggest that the consumer confusion with
ecolabel programs will be mitigated by uniformity in standards130 or by
more government intervention at the federal level.131 One author states that
“[c]learly defined national standards that have the effect of law are
necessary to combat the problems associated with green marketing.”132
Another author suggests that uniform national standards that preempt state
and local governments will solve consumer confusion over green marketing
claims.133 Yet, federally administered ecolabel programs still have issues of
122. See Gesser, supra note 14, at 511–15; TERRACHOICE GROUP, supra note 98, at 19–20.
123. Gesser, supra note 14, at 514–15.
124. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 141. “Negative information strategies, which
tend to be government mandated, are among the most effective. Neutral information strategies
such as environmental impact assessments are used to confront broad, cross medium
environmental concerns.” Id.
125. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 26–27.
126. Id. at 27.
127. See Grodsky, supra note 4, at 225–26 (stressing the importance of whether the parameters
are effective indicators of environmental quality).
128. Gesser, supra note 14, at 505.
129. O’Rourke, supra note 105, at 7.
130. See, e.g., Northen, supra note 13. “Universal definitions and standards in the green
marketplace” will hopefully mitigate greenwashing of organic food. Id. at 130.
131. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 11, at 1462–63; Fliegelman, supra note 13; White, supra note
13, at 325–26 (describing federal regulation options to protect consumers from greenwashing).
132. Avallone, supra note 13, at 686.
133. White, supra note 13, at 348.
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brand awareness and consumer communication that private organizations
face.134 Moreover, federalized ecolabel programs suffer from similar
disadvantages of traditional command and control standards.135
This note will describe the level of government administration, the
consumer miscomprehension associated with the ecolabel, and the
disadvantages the program shares with command and control regulations
for three ecolabel programs. The ecolabel programs evaluated are
environmental labels awarded to products that meet criteria so that they
earn a license to use the program seal or label.136 They also represent a
range of sustainable product categories.137 USDA Organic, ENERGY
STAR, and LEED Certified are industry-leading ecolabel programs that
consumers recognize.138
A. USDA ORGANIC: A FOOD LABEL CREATED AND ADMINISTERED
BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
The USDA Organic label identifies a food or agricultural product that
has been produced in compliance with “cultural, biological, and mechanical
practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and

134. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, CLIMATE PROT. DIV., EPA, NATIONAL
AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2009: ANALYSIS OF 2009 CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 7–8
(2010), available at http://www.cee1.org/eval/2009_ES_survey.pdf; Jason J. Czarnezki, The
Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle
Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 34 (2011) (noting that consumers “may identify ‘organic’ with
. . . . characteristics . . . often not true of many organic foods”).
135. Sean Rosner, Energy Star Criteria Now Tougher, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, Aug.–Sept.
2010, at 22. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR
PROGRAM: COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS
VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 1–3 (2010).
136. Gesser, supra note 14, at 503–04.
137. The sample of product categories includes food and agriculture, electrical products, and
buildings (LEED). Product categories are taken from Inhabitat website. Lea Bogdan, ECO
LABELS 101: Green Certifications Explained!, INHABITAT (Apr. 6, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://inhabitat.com/demystifying-eco-labels/print.
138. In 2008, the green building industry accounted for about 33 percent to 42 percent of dollars
spent in the building market and is expected to be 62 percent to 75 percent in 2013. GREENGUARD
ENVTL. INST., PRIMARY GREEN PRODUCT STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: A
COMPARISON 1 (2009) (citations omitted), available at http://www.greenguard.org
/Libraries/GG_Documents/Reformat_WP_GreenProdCertProgCompare_FINAL_1.sflb.ashx.
LEED is used throughout the country and is one of “the most commonly used and respected green
building rating and certification systems in the marketplace.” Vierra, supra note 112, at 3–4.
ENERGY STAR (Energy Star) is one of the “primary market movers” of green building product
labels. GREENGUARD ENVTL. INST., supra, at 1–2 (citing a McGraw-Hill Construction 2009
SmartMarkets report). In 2008, awareness of Energy Star programs among the building industry
was 83 percent, while Green Seal was 19 percent, FSC was 21 percent, and WaterSense was 14
percent. GREENGUARD ENVTL. INST., supra, at 2. Within the general environmental product
category, a 2009 EcoMarkets purchasing survey stated that Energy Star and USDA Organic were
two of the ten most recognized eco-label names in the United States. TERRACHOICE ENVTL.
MKTG., ECOMARKETS SUMMARY REPORT 23 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.terrachoice
.com/files/EcoMarkets%202009%20Summary%20Report%20-%20Oct%202009.pdf.
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conserve biodiversity.”139 Any agricultural product labeled as USDA
Organic must comply with the specific USDA organic regulations,140 which
focus on chemical-free food products and animal welfare.141 An agricultural
product is “any agricultural commodity or product . . . that is marketed in
the United States for human or livestock consumption,”142 and generally
categorized as either crops or livestock.143
The organic label is a positive information strategy144 and is processdriven, meaning it focuses on the inputs of agricultural productions.145 The
USDA Organic ecolabel program does not guarantee that the product is free
from pesticides or chemicals,146 nor does it certify the overall agricultural
land use process.147 Notably, the label does not represent nutritional or
food-safety benefits.148 Among banned practices are the uses of “[s]ynthetic
fertilizers, sewage sludge, irradiation, and genetic engineering;”149 these
production methods were widely opposed during the promulgation of the
rules.150
Organic livestock labeling requires additional procedures.151 For
example, the production standards prohibit using growth hormones.152 In
addition, animal welfare standards specify that the producer implement a
procedure that “accommodates the health and natural behavior of
animals.”153
139. National Organic Program, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, http://www.ams.usda.gov
/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateC&navID=NationalOrganicProgram
&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPConsumers&description=Consumers&acct
=nopgeninfo (last modified Aug. 7, 2012).
140. Organic Standards, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0
/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navID=OrganicStandardsLinkNOPOrganicSta
ndards&rightNav1=OrganicStandardsLinkNOPOrganicStandards&topNav=&leftNav=&page=N
OPOrganicStandards&resultType=&acct=nopgeninfo (last modified Aug. 14, 2012).
141. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 15.
142. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2010).
143. See id. (defining “crop” and “livestock”). Livestock includes “cattle, sheep, goats, swine,
poultry, . . . equine animals . . . [, and] game,” but excludes aquatic animals and bees. Id. See also
Organic Standards, supra note 140.
144. Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for Sustainable
Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 634 (2010) (citations omitted).
145. Mikael Klintman, Ambiguous Framings of Political Consumerism: Means or End, Product
or Process Orientation?, 30 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 427, 432 (2006); Pollans, supra note 144,
at 641.
146. Friedland, supra note 113, at 384–85. The National Organic Program (NOP) is supposed to
require organic certifying agents to conduct periodic testing for pesticide residue. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 2–3.
147. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 15.
148. NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 5.
149. National Organic Program, supra note 139.
150. Conner & Christy, supra note 9. The NOP initially tried to qualify “genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), biosolids, and irradiation” as permitted organic methods of production, but
ultimately banned them in the promulgated rule. Id.
151. See generally National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.236–205.239 (2010).
152. Id. § 205.237(b)(1).
153. Id. § 205.239(a).
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In its infancy, “organic agriculture began . . . on a very small scale”
with a “dedicated group of semi-idealist[]” farmers.154 Then Congress
passed the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, which required the
USDA to promulgate uniform standards for foods labeled as “organic.”155
The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Services created the National Organic
Program (NOP) to administer the program, from developing standards to
establishing the organic certification program.156 The NOP regulations
address organic production, identification, certification, and accreditation
standards for agricultural products.157
After the federal government intervened, organic food labeling
transformed “from a more complex and diverse system to a nationally
standardized” labeling program.158 As of 2008, organic products accounted
for “over 3 percent of total U.S. food sales.”159 In 2008, produce comprised
37 percent of total organic sales, with dairy the next top seller at 16 percent,
while organic meat, fish, and poultry accounted for only 3 percent of
organic sales.160 The organic label has been criticized for assuming that a
food labeling system for organic foods is a simple process, “as if organic
foods were something absolute,” and that developing uniform national
standards will enable green consumerism to flourish.161
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception
Consumers misunderstand the label’s meaning and function.162 Many
believe the organic label means that the product is free from residual
amounts of banned products that unintentionally contaminated the product,
that buying organic products supports small farms, that organic farms are
local farms, or that organic livestock promotes animal welfare.163
Consumers of organic products justify their willingness to pay for the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Klintman, supra note 145, at 431.
NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 5.
Id.
Id. (explaining crop standards and livestock standards, grouped separately).
Klintman, supra note 145, at 431.
Organic Agriculture: Organic Market Overview, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic
-market-overview.aspx (last updated June 19, 2012) (citations omitted).
160. Id. “Produce accounted for 37 percent of U.S. organic food sales in 2008, followed by
dairy (16 percent), beverages (13 percent), packaged and prepared foods (13 percent), bread and
grains (10 percent), snack foods (5 percent), meat, fish, and poultry (3 percent), and condiments (3
percent).” Id.
161. Klintman, supra note 145, at 427–28.
162. Conner & Christy, supra note 9.
163. Kate L. Harrison, Comment, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic
Standards, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 221–27 (2008). See also id. at 233 (recommending an
“Organic Plus” label for products “tested GMO and pesticide residue free,” “produced without the
use of mined additives,” “produced on a small family farm,” “locally produced,” and “pasture
raised”).
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organic products with reasons of “support for sustainable agriculture and
local food systems, and opposition to the ‘corporate’ food system.”164
Organic farming and sustainable farming are not necessarily equivalent
practices.165 A sustainable ecolabel would likely indicate the food’s carbon
footprint, waste, natural resource impact from water consumption and land
use, and health attributes.166 Organic farming may cause environmental
tradeoffs because the energy savings from nonuse of chemicals is often
offset by an energy increase in cultivating and harvesting, as organic crop
yields per acre tend to be less than conventional farming practices.167
Likewise, organic farming is not reserved for noncorporate small
businesses.168 Some of the largest food company brand names, like CocaCola, Dole, General Mills, H.J. Heinz, Kellogg, Mars, Kraft, Sara Lee, and
Tyson Foods, have directly or indirectly acquired organic food lines.169
Consumer confusion also arises over the level of animal welfare that the
organic label indicates. Livestock must have access to outdoor space yearround, but this standard has been interpreted as only requiring an
“opportunity to exit” and does not “mandate that an entire herd or flock
have access to the outdoors at any one time.”170 In addition, the regulations
distinguish between grazing (ruminant) animals and non-grazing (poultry)
animals.171 Ruminant livestock must be allowed to graze for sustenance on
pastures for at least 1/3 of the year.172 Organic poultry seems to withstand
the worst of this distinction’s burden, because some certifiers have abused
the temporary confinement loophole to confine birds.173
2. Similar Problems Between the Ecolabel and Certification
Program and Technology-Based Standards
The biggest problem with the USDA Organic label is its inconsistent
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.174 The USDA Agricultural
164. Conner & Christy, supra note 9, at 42.
165. Pollans, supra note 144, at 640–41; see also Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 31.
166. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 31 (advocating for a new ecolabel that evaluates the food
product comprehensively for its lifecycle and for multiple attributes).
167. SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION, supra note 115, at 23.
168. Friedland, supra note 113, at 409.
169. Id. “As of 2003, five extremely large farms controlled half of California’s $400 million
organic produce market.” Id.
170. NAT’L ORGANIC PROGRAM, USDA, POLICY MEMO 11-5, ACCESS TO THE OUTDOORS FOR
LIVESTOCK (2011), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName
=STELPRDC5088950.
171. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.239 (2010).
172. Id. §§ 205.237, 205.239(a).
173. See Sheila Rodriguez, The Morally Informed Consumer: Examining Animal Welfare
Claims on Egg Labels, 30 TEMP J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 73 (2011).
174. E.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6; Gabriel Nelson, USDA’s Organic
Enforcement Let Offenders Slide, Audit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/gwire/2010/03/19/19greenwire-usdas-organic-enforcers-let-offenders-slide-au12233.html?pagewanted=print.
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Marketing Service administers the NOP ecolabel program.175 The NOP is
supposed “to assure consumers that organic products meet uniform
standards and that they are appropriately labeled.”176 This is a daunting task
for a program that had a staff of sixteen and a budget of about four million
dollars in 2009.177 NOP’s resources are insufficient to monitor 30,000
certified farms and facilities and 100 accredited certifiers.178 Between 2006
and 2008, the USDA notified the NOP about five products in violation of
the USDA Organic label criteria;179 it took the NOP an average of fifteen
months to respond to each violation.180
In 2010, the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) published the
findings of its NOP audit.181 It found that despite the Organic Food
Production Act of 1990 requiring certified agents to “conduct periodic
residue testing of organic products,” the NOP regulations purposely omitted
such obligations because of costs and “complex issues.”182 The OIG audited
four USDA-accredited certifying agents responsible for certifying over
5,000 farms and found that not a single farm was tested periodically for
residue.183 Additionally, due to budget and logistic constraints, the NOP
failed to follow its own requirements for evaluating its internal performance
in every year except for its inception year.184
B. ENERGY STAR: AN APPLIANCE LABEL CREATED AND
ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The EPA and Department of Energy (DOE) share joint responsibility in
administering the ENERGY STAR (Energy Star) ecolabel program.185 The
purpose of the Energy Star label program is to reduce air pollution resulting
175. National Organic Program Background Information, supra note 5.
176. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 1.
177. See id. at 39 (noting that the NOP hoped to increase both its staff size and budget); Nelson,
supra note 174.
178. Organic Certification & Accreditation, National Organic Program, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV.,
USDA,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navID
=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPAccreditationandCerti
fication&description=Accreditation%20and%20Certification&acct=nopgeninfo (last modified
Apr. 17, 2012).
179. Nelson, supra note 174.
180. Id.
181. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 32. This audit was conducted between 2008
and 2009. Id.
182. Id. at 2–3 (internal citations omitted).
183. Id. at 2, 7.
184. Id. at 18. In 2004, the American National Standards Institute reviewed the NOP and found
that it “lacked documented policies and procedures for managing the accreditation of certifying
agents.” Id.
185. Geoffrey M. White et al., Green Building Rating Systems and Green Leases, in THE LAW
OF GREEN BUILDINGS 15, 27 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard eds., 2010).
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from inefficient energy consumption and to help consumers identify the
products that are superior in energy efficiency performance.186 Home
appliances and products identified as Energy Star products have complied
with energy efficiency and energy savings criteria.187
The Energy Star program generally promotes a single environmental
characteristic—energy efficiency—and does not indicate overall positive
environmental performance.188 Within the Appliance category, the EPA sets
ecolabel criteria for dehumidifiers and room air cleaners.189 The DOE
regulates clothes washers, dishwashers, refrigerators and freezers, and room
air conditioners; furthermore, these product categories must comply with
additional federal standards.190 The Energy Star ecolabel was intended to
identify the top 25 percent most efficient products within a particular
category; thus, it is most useful when there is a variance in energy usage
among product models.191 Once too many models meet the requirements,
the agency will need to revise the specifications again so that it perpetually
stays ahead of the market.192
Congress created the Energy Star program as part of the Clean Air Act,
federal legislation that strives to reduce air pollution.193 Additionally,
section 131 of the Energy Policy Act mandates that the EPA and DOE
promote Energy Star labeled products in the marketplace.194 These federal
laws basically preempt states from setting more stringent appliance
standards than the Energy Star program requires.195
With the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, federal agencies
must purchase certain energy efficient equipment, of which Energy Star

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

ENERGY STAR, supra note 5, at 2.
White et al., supra note 185.
Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 137.
EPA, MAINTAINING THE VALUE OF ENERGY STAR 10 (2007).
Id. at 10–11 tbl.1. For example, an Energy Star labeled refrigerator should exceed federal
minimum energy efficiency requirements by 20 percent or more. Promoting Energy Star Qualified
Refrigerators, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/manuf_res/salestraining_res
/Refrigerator_Sell_Sheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 2010).
191. ENERGY STAR, supra note 5, at 10 (“If all product models used approximately equal
amounts of energy, then an ENERGY STAR specification would not be pragmatic . . . .”).
192. See id. at 11.
Once an ENERGY STAR specification is in place for some amount of time, market
conditions and the available model mix may change, resulting in a majority of models
meeting the specification. Thus, the label would no longer serve as a differentiator. This
scenario dictates that EPA and DOE reassess the specification and potentially revise it,
so that the label again serves to identify the most efficient models.
Id.

193. See EPA, supra note 189, at 6.
194. Id.
195. Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federalism,
Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335, 346
(2010).
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labeled products qualify.196 Because manufacturers are strongly
incentivized to cater to such a significant market sector, the federal public
procurement guidelines infiltrate the private market as well.197 There are
over 40,000 products that have earned the Energy Star label in over 60
different categories.198 In 2009, Americans purchased about 300,000,000
Energy Star products.199
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception
Energy Star ecolabels should help consumers determine which
appliances save energy and money over the product lifetime as compared to
other models.200 A 2009 survey found that most of the polled consumers
who were aware of the Energy Star label felt that by purchasing such
labeled products they were “helping to protect the environment for future
generations” and “contributing to society.”201 Sixty percent of the polled
consumers thought the label conveyed “energy efficiency or energy
savings” and 17 percent thought the label conveyed “environmental
benefits.”202 The EPA said that these responses showed “high understanding
of the label.”203
Of the consumers who recognized the Energy Star label, 25 percent
associated it with clothes dryers, 11 percent with stoves and ovens, and 4
percent with microwave ovens, despite that these appliances are incapable
of receiving the Energy Star label—no specifications exist.204 As previously
mentioned, an ecolabel may confuse the consumer by representing itself as
a good option overall, rather than a “less bad” option.205 A comparable
analogy with ecolabels is that an energy-intensive appliance may receive an
Energy Star label for being more efficient than comparable products,
though a nonelectrical alternative is not considered.206

196. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 135, at 6–10; Product Purchasing
and Computer Power Management for Federal Agencies, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar
.gov/index.cfm?c=fed_agencies.fed_ag_index (last accessed Sept. 22, 2012).
197. SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION, supra note 115, at 12–13.
198. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, EPA 430-R-11-002, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER
CLIMATE PROTECTION PARTNERSHIPS 4 (2010).
199. Id.
200. Matthew L. Wald & Leslie Kaufman, U.S. Tightens Requirements for Energy Star
Certification, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at B4.
201. OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, supra note 134, at C-7.
202. Id. at 14.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 7–8.
205. An American Heart Association initiative labeled foods that were less bad than comparable
foods regarding heart disease. Grodsky, supra note 4, at 210 (citations omitted).
206. See id. at 211. A vacuum cleaner might be labeled as more energy efficient than other
vacuum cleaners, but a typical broom that uses even less energy “could fall outside the categories
of products tested.” Id.
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Because so many products receive the Energy Star label, the program
has been criticized for “diluting its impact.”207 In 2010, Consumer Reports
stated that 75 percent “of TVs, dishwashers and humidifiers qualified for
Energy Star designation in 2009” even though the program aimed to
identify the top 25 percent performing appliances.208 They urged the
government program to award products that are truly the top one-third
energy efficiency performers in their sector.209 Additionally, Consumer
Reports believes that the government should be more vigilant and “review
Energy Star qualification criteria and tests about every three years.”210
2. How the Ecolabel and Certification Program Suffers from
Similar Problems of Technology-Based Standards
Because of the numerous products and categories, the Energy Star
ecolabel program has been a uniform national standard that is incredibly
difficult to enforce.211 The enormity of rulemaking procedures, costs, and
review periods impedes the government’s ability to promulgate revised
standards in a reasonable time.212 This leads to energy efficiency standards
that are “extremely out-of-date;”213 meanwhile, the appliance manufacturers
have little incentive to exceed the Energy Star ecolabel certification
requirements on their own initiative.214
A 2010 Consumer Reports study highlighted the disparity in what
Energy Star standards require compared to actual product performance.215
More notably, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
conducted an independent investigation and found that the Energy Star
label was used on “radically inefficient products” and that the certification
requirements were “easily manipulated.”216 The GAO found that the DOE
basically trusted the manufacturers to certify their own products and relied
on the vendors to enforce compliance with energy efficiency standards.217

207. Taylor Knight, New Label Takes Energy Star One Step Further, USA TODAY, Aug. 31,
2011, (Money), at 3b.
208. Id.
209. Viewpoint. Energy Star Improves, CONSUMER REP., July 9, 2010, at 6.
210. Id.
211. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 135, at 1–3, 15.
212. Klass, supra note 195, at 349–50.
213. Id. at 349.
214. Id.
215. Alan Wolf, Feds Testing Appliances for Energy Star Compliance, TWICE: THIS WEEK
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, Apr. 25, 2010, at 35.
216. Rosner, supra note 135. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 135, at
7–8 (describing the fictitious products that the GAO submitted that received the Energy Star
label).
217. “Our proactive testing revealed that the Energy Star program is primarily a selfcertification program relying on corporate honesty and industry self-policing to protect the
integrity of the Energy Star label.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 135, at 8;
see Wolf, supra note 215.

246

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

The EPA and DOE realized that they needed to “regain consumer trust
in the Energy Star label.”218 To help encourage innovation, they created a
new “Energy Star Most Efficient program,” which recognizes the best
Energy Star ecolabel products.219 And to increase credibility in the
certification process, manufacturers pursuing either Energy Star label must
now have their product certified by an EPA-approved facility.220
C. LEADERSHIP IN ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (LEED): A
BUILDINGS LABEL CREATED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL
The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) administers the most
prolific green building rating system in the country.221 Buildings that
receive LEED certification meet criteria that take a “whole-building
approach to sustainability.”222 Only LEED Certified buildings have the right
to use the LEED Certification Mark to advertise the building’s
environmental attributes.223 Their four levels of certification—Platinum,
Gold, Silver, and Certified—each have a unique ecolabel.224 To earn a level
of certification, buildings earn points in categories: sustainable sites, water
efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor
environmental quality, innovation in design, and regional considerations.225
The USGBC is a nonprofit organization comprised of industry leaders
who develop, revise, and administer the LEED green building certification
program.226 However, federal, state, and local governments have begun to
encroach on this voluntarily-sought ecolabel program.227 Certain federal
218. Rosner, supra note 135.
219. Knight, supra note 207.
220. Id.
ENERGY STAR partners had historically been able to test their products in any
laboratory of their choice, and submit product data directly to EPA for review pursuant
to qualification. Under the new requirements, which became effective January 1,
2011, partners are required to have their products certified by an EPA-recognized
Certification Body (CB) of their choice.
Third-Party Certification, ENERGY STAR, http://energystar.supportportal.com/link/portal/23002
/23018/Article/31965/How-do-ENERGY-STAR-partners-qualify-products-under-the-third-party
-certification-requirements (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
221. Geoffrey M. White et al., supra note 185, at 25; see About USGBC, U.S. GREEN BLDG.
COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=18692 (last updated July 27,
2012).
222. What LEED Measures, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage
.aspx?CMSPageID=1989 (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
223. USGBC Trademark Policy, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, 15 (2011), http://www.usgbc.org
/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=3885 (last updated May 13, 2011).
224. Id.
225. See What LEED Measures, supra note 222.
226. About USGBC, supra note 221.
227. Les Lo Baugh, LEED Green Building Incentives, PLI Order No. 16007 PRACTISING L.
INST. 23, 25–29 (2008); TASK GROUP ON BLDG. RATING AND CERTIFICATION, NAT’L INST. OF
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agencies now require their public buildings to obtain LEED certification,228
and state and local governments incentivize private buildings to do so.229
Cities also are beginning to incorporate LEED green building rating system
criteria by reference in their local building codes.230 The USGBC estimates
that “442 localities[,] . . . 35 state governments . . . , [and] 14 federal
agencies or departments” have implemented LEED-referencing government
initiatives.231
Because building codes are typically adopted and enforced by state and
local governments, the federal government has minimal regulatory
infrastructure to enforce its own national green building program.232 Some
critics, nonetheless, call for “[a] comprehensive green building code
addressing the multi-faceted environmental impacts of buildings.”233 Others
advocate for the importance of maintaining individual local programs
because of the inherent issue in adopting a voluntary ecolabel and
certification program as a national standard.234 Governments and agencies
rapidly adopt voluntary building certification programs as building
standards “without fully understanding their benefits, tradeoffs, and
costs.”235 The building community is uncomfortable with such voluntary
programs being transformed into required programs.236
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception
The stakeholders in the building industry have “significant
misperceptions and misguided expectations” of what the ecolabel
certification programs represent.237 Some of the confusion may be because
LEED certification is process-based, rather than product-based.238 Even
though LEED Certified buildings are designed to exceed energy efficiency
performance of a typical building, their actual performance may not be any
BLDG. SCIS., REPORT ON BUILDING RATING AND CERTIFICATION IN THE U.S. BUILDING
COMMUNITY 7 (2009), available at http://www.nibs.org/client/assets/files/nibs/NIBS
_RatingCertificationTaskGroupReport.pdf.
228. Baugh, supra note 227, at 35–38.
229. Id. at 28–29.
230. Hupp, supra note 117, at 644.
231. LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE, supra note 5.
232. See Shari Shapiro, Who Should Regulate? Federalism and Conflict in Regulation of Green
Buildings, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 276 (2009).
233. Id. at 279.
234. Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED®: Municipal Adoption of Private Green
Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285, 300 (2010). “[O]rdinances that force private developers
to comply with uniform standards developed by a private building-industry organization are
fraught with practical and legal problems.” Id. at 290.
235. TASK GROUP ON BLDG. RATING AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 227.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The certification process begins before occupants even enter the building. See Sara C.
Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States,
93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 242 (2009).
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more energy efficient than a nonrated building.239 Additionally, owners are
able to pick and choose which points to earn, usually by striving for the
easiest points to obtain.240 Thus, energy performance and indoor air quality
during the building occupancy could be inconsistent among LEED Certified
buildings with the same level of points.
2. How the Ecolabel and Certification Program Suffers from
Similar Problems of Technology-Based Standards
The LEED green building rating system program strikes an appropriate
balance between standards and innovation. Nonetheless, its technologybased component is criticized for stifling innovation and for inadequate
administrative capabilities to oversee a national program.241 With the LEED
green building rating system, all of the measures are assigned the same
value, regardless of costs or associated benefits.242 The USGBC is also
known for long delays in certification and backups in applications.243
Granted, the LEED green building rating system is revised constantly to
ensure it remains an innovative ecolabel and certification program.244 Yet,
the constant change is also a downfall to its effectiveness, as industries must
constantly meet a moving target.245
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION TO PRESERVE ECOLABEL AWARENESS
Ecolabel programs combine the expedience and enforceability of
technology-based standards246 with industry innovation and public
participation.247 Ecolabels raise consumer awareness about environmental
products, substantiate marketing claims, and encourage innovation by
stimulating a market for new technology.248 Although ecolabels are not
without their flaws, federalizing one type of environmental standard that
addresses all possible product impacts is unlikely to be feasible.249 Many
ecolabel programs are inherently unsuitable for federal uniform
239. White et al., supra note 185, at 20, 23–24; see Mireya Navarro, Some Buildings Not Living
up to Green Label, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, at A8.
240. Bronin, supra note 238; Schindler, supra note 234, at 327–28.
241. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1334–40.
242. White et al., supra note 185, at 23.
243. Id.
244. About LEED, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx
?DocumentID=18694 (last updated July 27, 2012). “The hallmark of LEED and its ability to
affect market transformation is its continuous improvement cycle that enables the rating system to
increase in scope and stringency as market readiness increases and new technologies become
widely available.” Id.
245. See Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1272.
246. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 94.
247. See Grodsky, supra note 4, at 207.
248. Gesser, supra note 14, at 511–12.
249. Id. at 514–15; see Latin, supra note 28, at 1279.
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standards.250 Additionally, this note argues that governmentally
administered ecolabel programs suffer from both consumer
miscomprehension and command and control consequences. Thus,
environmental advocates and industries alike should be weary of
obliterating a hybrid regulatory approach with federalized command and
control regulations.
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